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Because this is an important work it is unfortunate that it is not more readable. Throughout its five hundred pages one encounters whole sections that ought to have been mere paragraphs. More important, as justifiable as is Moore's tripartite division of the work (it moves from theory to example, and from example back to theory), the suspicion will persist that he has written two works instead of one. that he has tried to build a cathedral where a modest chapel would have served. Readers (1966) . Thcsc stylistic criticisms are not meant to discourage anyone from reading Injustice but, rather, to prepare the reader for the long but worthwhile ordeal ahead.
If a choice faces all sensitive twentieth-century thinkers between "tragic optimism" and "courageous pessimism," Moore chooses the latter. He believes that limits and tragedy are as real to the human condition as happiness and the promise of progress. This spirit shapes his response to the question: "Why do people so often put u p with being victims of their society and why, at other times, do they try to do something about it?" Moore rejects the either-or choice between nature and culture. Man, he believes, does have basic psychological and material needs that enter into every human context and in large measure determine his happiness and misery. At the same time, the givens of human nature are mediated by culture and are shaped by three fundamental realities that characterize every society: authoriry. division of labor, and the allocation of goods and services.
Authority. unless it rests on terror, must be based on a sense of mutual obligation. This sense emerges most vividly and passionately at such times as authority is called into question. Analogous to the relation between child and parent, society's authority is based upon an implicit exchange of security for obedience. The division of labor, to take Moore's second term, can be achieved by sheer compulsion, as is the case so often in modern predatory, national societies; or it can rest, as is nearly always the case in more primitive societies, upon consensus and allocation by tradition. Always at play in the discussion of justice is a preference for personal property, and resentment and sanctions against the lazy, the do-nothing, and the faineanr. The distribution of goods and services, the third element of the social order, is associated with people's varying sense of equality and fairness. The sense of fairness indicts all those who take without giving-the parasites, the exploiters, the bloodsuckers, the moochers-and all those who have riches beyond their own need but don't share them-the nonmagnanimous rich, the hoarders, the stingy.
Having KeepRedCmssready for his answer: His cxamples are ascetics, untouchables, and victims of Nazi concentration camps. People can use suffcring, hloorc argues, to escape their existence; they can accept suffering because authority requires it, or because they are conditioned to it. Sometimes the oppressed have so internalized thcir condition that they idealize and mimic their oppressors. Moore notes the hierarchical orders that exist among the untouchables and among the Jewish inmates who emulated the dress of their S.S. guards.
For Moorc, then, only the most optimistic assume that revolt will always arise in opposition to "intolerable conditions." Authority and tradition most often dictate against revolt. I t takes insight and courage to resist oppression. Moral autonomy, Moore argues, is a prerequisite for revolt, and moral autonomy is not plentiful in modern industrial society. Furthermore, empathy (love, sympathetic identification. or whatever else one might call it) does not assure social justice. "Under certain conditions it can be very powerful," Moore writes, "but it won't get food and water into the cities and garbage off the streets."
If in Part I Moore has shown that there are as many reasons for mankind to conform as to revolt, in Part I 1 his argument takes yet a more pessimistic turn. Here he analyzes the German labor movement and concludesagainst all those who currently idealize the revolutionary potential of the German worker movement-that it never could have made the revolution that would have saved Germany from the First World War or, later, Nazism. Organized labor was never as large as is commonly assumed, and was for the most part local, divided, and differentiated. Furthermore, the worker's issues were not the intellectual's abstractions of universal justice, freedom, and brotherhood but. rather, the more basic matters of fair play, decency, and respect. and which threatens to turn into a nightmare." Moore knows that in matters of state, "terror and progress" (to borrow the title of one of his works on the Soviet Union) are not strangers. He does not counsel surrender. He would have us get on with the business of being responsible, not just for ourselves and our own fate, but for the creation of "the basic conditions that make rational authority feasible and turn predatory forms of authority into a pathological rather than a normal state of affairs." Yet, to this end, he sees no path but a truthful and expanding consciousness and empathy. This sort of "ex is tent ial utilitarianism," or "courageous pessimism," is where Moore would have us begin reflecting on injustice in our broken, divided, and warring world. In reconstructing this event, Professor Selzer has accomplished a work of considerable historical merit and moral impact. We are reminded that KZ Dachau was not designed as a death factory: 31,951 are listed as having died there, mostly from disease, malnutrition, and mistreatment; many thousands more, it is certain, died unrecorded. And the dying continued long after the arrival of the Americans, despite the efforts of military physicians, who were stunned to find themselves dealing with a variety of syndromes previously encountered only in medical textbooks. Dachau was a comparatively lesser part of the total scheme of human destruction in the camps between 1933 and 1945, but when it opened in March, 1933, it had the distinction of being the first formally sanctioned concentration camp in National Socialist Germany.
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Dachau, as Selzer tells us. had a "heterogeneous population," and this is one reason he chose to study this particular camp. Only near the end of the war did it come to have large numbers of Jewish inmates, underscoring Selzer's point that "the camps, as such, were not a distinctively Jewish tragedy." Jehovah's Witnesses, gypsies, Christian clergymen, captured Resistance fighters, ordinary German citizens, and even members of the Wehrmacht itself-in short, virtually anyone who happened to get in the way of Hitler's Cleichschalrung was a candidate for Dachau. Nevertheless, Dachau marks the beginning of the Holocaust, of the "Final Solution to the Jewish Question." Selzer's story forces us to consider that absolutely nothing was done from the outside to help these people, nor those at worse places, even when Allied military supremacy was established beyond all question and when British and American assistance to the underground in various Germanoccupied countries was both plentiful and commonplace. Not a gesture. Not even a sign that we knew what was happening to them-and we did know, in detail, well before the first camp was overrun.
Selzer relates the fate of the Russian prisoners of war at Dachau. At the liberation 3,000 were a l i v e 4 u r i n g the war they were commonly used as live targets at the S.S. rifle range-and they were eventually sent back to the Soviet Union, many of them unwillingly, for Stalin did not take kindly to troops who laid down their weapons instead of their A handful of gracefully reworked lectures proposes that the answer to "mass poverty" is an "accommodation" that breaks "the equilibrium of poverty." Actually, Galbraith is somewhat more modest than that, acknowledging that his idea of "accommodation" may be one of a set of answers. Accommodation basically means the movement from agricultural to industrial work, from rural to urban living. Key to this is migration, both within and among nations. Galbraith views migration historically and in its global dimensions and applies its lessons to support a very positive position toward "illegal immigrants" in this country, notably those from Mexico. There are some curious mistakes, such as his claim that the U.S. spends nearly X i 120 billion annually to police its borders, and more conventional mistakes, such as the assumption throughout that China is way ahead of India in terms of economic development. There is also a curious, for Galbraith, move away from "socialist" solutions. Indeed, the burden of his argument is against varieties of socialism that turn out to be "disas- Those of us on the humanistic side of what C.P. Snow described as thz "two cultures'' are enormously indebted to Robert Jastrow, the astronomer who heads NASA's Goddard Institute and who writes with a singular elegance about the truly elegant discoveries of a science that is quite beyond most of us. This little book is about the Big Bang theory of how everything got started, a theory that is more elegantly, and accurately, described as the Beginning, or, if you will, the Creation. With a sense of amused curiosity Jastrow demonstrates how such eminent scientists as Einstein resisted the evidence as long as they could because it implied conclusions unamenable to scientistic religion. Norton is asking a big price for a book very slight in size (and even that is achieved by excessive padding with marginally relevant photographs), but it is by no means slight in its power to inform and provoke. ' Devine teaches philosophy at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and here offers an admirably reasoned argument for the "presumption against killing." Relatively few citizens seem to be aware that our society is at this moment engaged in life-and-death decisions about the definition of the human existence for which we accept societal responsibility. The specific issues have to do with abortion, euthanasia, suicide, war, murder, and capital punishment, and the laws appropriate to each. Devine does not operate from a partisan religious base-indeed he makes quite a point of that-but he is keenly alert to the difficulties in separating ethical judgment from religious conviction. Summer, 1972) . He, too, concludes that revolution is best characterized by the profundity of the change it brings, not by the method of the bringing ("Revolution, then, is a flagrant and abrupt change in the fundamental conditions of legality.").
Weir is also at odds with the thinking of many modern revolutionaries. In a country such as the United States, "founded," as Susan Sontag says, "on a genocide" (Styles of Radical Will, 1969). and with a history so full of violence it scarcely fits in two hundrcd years, the practice of nonviolence may be the most revolutionary idea one could have.
If Weir wishes to discuss armed insurrection, that's fine. But there is no need to adjust revolution to his Procrustean definition.
Rory Sutton
Irliaca. N . Y.
*Weir speaks of revolution in China. so evidently twenty-four years is sufficiently rapid. **In 011 Violericc Arcndt argues that all action is uncertain and violent action particularly so. There is always the possibility that the exercise of violence in the service of distant ends will result simply in the institutionalization of violence as normal social relations: "Violence like all action changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent world" (p. 80).
Violence, then, insofar as it can be justified at all. is justifiablc only in pursuit of very short-term goals: "And indeed, violence, contrary to what its prophets try to tell us, is more the weapon of reform than revolution" (p. 79).
